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ABSTRACT: Over the last twenty years, New Zealand courts have extended the
State’s child protection powers to the fetus as an “unborn child.” The child care
and protection agency, Oranga Tamariki, purports to protect children, but its
oversight regulates pregnantwomen’s choices about how they run their lives and
what they do with their bodies. This Note argues for a reconstruction of State
intervention in pregnancy to empower pregnant women’s fully autonomous
decision making and provide the social conditions and resources to support
family life.
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INTRODUCTION
State child protection agencies have a vexed relationship with pregnancy.
The vexed relationship arises from the paradox of pregnancy raising two subjects
of State interest: a present pregnant woman and a future child. In this moment of
paradox, pregnancy can be a positive opportunity for the State to support
pregnant women to prepare for wanted, healthy pregnancies and stable parenting
relationships. Equally, pregnancy can be a site of pernicious State regulation that
restricts a pregnant woman’s ability to make decisions about her own life and
imposes a government standard for family life that excludes women who fall
outside white middle-class norms of “good” motherhood.
The promise and peril in State intervention is illustrated by the work of New
Zealand’s new government agency for children and young people, Oranga
Tamariki—Ministry for Children. In 2017, Oranga Tamariki replaced the former
government agency for child protection services, Child, Youth and Family, after
an Expert Advisory Panel found the agency was failing to meet the needs of
children and young people.
1
Oranga Tamariki aims to build a child-centered,
investment approach to working with children and young people. The Ministry
intends to replace the traditional “crisis response” model for child protection
services with a system “focused on prevention and early intervention, with the
aim of having fewer children moving through the system and into care.”
2
Critically, this investment model is built on “high aspirations” for tamariki Māori
(Māori children and young people).
3
In the new “investment model,” prevention and early intervention begin with
pregnancy. Oranga Tamariki sees pre-birth as a “unique opportunity” to work
1. Modernising Child, Youth and Family Expert Panel, Expert Panel Final Report: Investing in
New Zealand’s Children and their Families 20 (2015) [hereinafter Final Report]; see also Cabinet Social
Policy Committee Minute of Decision “Organisational Form to Support the New Operating Model for
Vulnerable Children.”
2. What We Do, ORANGA TAMARIKI, https://www.orangatamariki.govt.nz/about-us/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/NNQ8-PFL2].
3. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11; and Who We Are, ORANGA TAMARIKI, https://www.orang
atamariki.govt.nz/about-us/overview/ [https://perma.cc/FRL9-JFY8].
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with families, whānau
4
and other professionals to assess parenting capacity,
determine a family’s needs and implement a plan that will secure the immediate
safety of the newborn infant and its “brightest future.”
5
The pre-birth practice
framework is supported by a line of New Zealand cases holding that the agency
is empowered to investigate reports of concern for an “unborn child” and apply
to the courts for statutory orders over that “unborn child.”
6
Oranga Tamariki is a part of New Zealand’s broader efforts to rectify a
shameful record of neglecting certain groups of children’s wellbeing and make
New Zealand “the best place in the world to be a child.”
7
In 2016, New Zealand’s
child poverty monitor found 27 percent of New Zealand children lived in
households experiencing income poverty and seven percent lived in severe
poverty.
8
Almost one in four New Zealand children have been subject to at least
one report to child protective services by age seventeen and around one in ten
have suffered abuse or neglect.
9
While Indigenous Māori are found at all levels
of socio-economic status in New Zealand,
10
Māori children experience
significantly higher rates of deprivation and disadvantage than New Zealand
European children. Māori children are twice as likely as non-Māori to live in
food insecure households and have significantly higher rates of mortality and
hospitalization for medical conditions.
11
New Zealand’s contemporary efforts to address child poverty are anchored
in its context of colonization. In New Zealand’s colonial history, the Crown
alienated Indigenous Māori land and resources and undermined the Māori
4. ”Whānau” is the Māori concept of an extended family or family group, or “a multigenerational
collective made up of many households that are supported and strengthened by a wider network of
relation” Whānau,MĀORIDICTIONARY, https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?idiom=&phrase=&proverb
=&loan=&histLoanWords=&keywords=whanau [https://perma.cc/7YXJ-HEBL]; see also FIONA CRAM,
FAMILIES COMMISSION—KŌMIHANA Ā WHĀNAU, SAFETY OF SUBSEQUENT CHILDREN: MĀORI
CHILDREN ANDWHĀNAU 11 (2012).
5. ORANGA TAMARIKI PRACTICE CENTRE, STRENGTHENING OUR RESPONSE TO UNBORN BABIES,
https://practice.orangatamariki.govt.nz/policy/assessment-and-decisionmaking/key-information/strength
ening-our-response-to-unborn-babies/ [https://perma.cc/C4YN-V7W5].
6. See, e.g., In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child) [1995] NZFLR 577 (FC); Re an Unborn Child
[2003] 1 NZLR 115 (HC); L v. Chief Executive Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Vulnerable Children
[2018] NZHC 1420.
7. Jacinda Ardern, 40th Prime Minister of New Zealand, Speech to 9th Annual Social Good Summit
(Sept. 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/D5K5-HKNY. See also NEW ZEALANDGOVERNMENT, OURPLAN: THE
GOVERNMENT’S PRIORITIES FOR NEW ZEALAND, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2018-
09/Our%20Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE78-9LMC].
8. M. DUNCANSON ET. AL., NEW ZEALAND CHILD AND YOUTH EPIDEMIOLOGY SERVICE, CHILD
POVERTYMONITOR: TECHNICALREPORT 3 (2017). The 2018 report of the Child Poverty Monitor did not
include updated income poverty rates due to issues relating to sample size.
9. Bénédicte Rouland & Rhema Vaithianathan,Cumulative Prevalence of Maltreatment Among New
Zealand Children, 1998-2015, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 511, 512 (2018).
10. See EXPERT ADVISORY GROUP ON SOLUTIONS TO CHILD POVERTY, WORKING PAPER NO. 14:
REDUCING CHILD POVERTY IN MĀORI WHĀNAU 1 (2012), https://www.occ.org.nz/assets/Uploads/EAG/
Working-papers/No-14-Reducing-poverty-in-Maori-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVV7-SKXT].
11. See M. DUNCANSON ET AL., NEW ZEALAND CHILD AND YOUTH EPIDEMIOLOGY SERVICE,
UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO, DUNEDIN, CHILD POVERTY MONITOR TECHNICAL REPORT (2018),
http://www.nzchildren.co.nz/ [https://perma.cc/25M5-RVVS].
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cultural, spiritual and economic base. New Zealand’s policies, institutions and
infrastructure are steeped with notions of Māori inferiority and Pākehā (New
Zealand European) superiority.
12
The legacy of colonization is “the differential
distribution of social, political, environmental and economic resources and
wellbeing . . . with Māori bearing the brunt of disparities.”
13
This Note argues that extending the State’s discretionary child protection
powers to the fetus as an “unborn child” in New Zealand’s environment of
structural inequality and colonial oppression perversely acts to constrain the
rights and interests of the very women the State has an obligation to empower. I
contend that the State should not abandon pregnancy intervention, but
reconstruct interventions in line with an affirmative concept of the right to
privacy emphasizing the duty of the State to provide social conditions and
resources to support pregnant women’s fully autonomous decision making.
The Note begins in Part I by tracing how the New Zealand courts have found
the State’s child care and protection powers extend to protect the “unborn child”
from harm. I outline how Oranga Tamariki pursues this accepted State interest
in the “unborn child” through an intensive investment model that prioritizes
prevention and early intervention services beginning before birth. Part II argues
that framing the fetus as an “unborn child” has served to obscure pregnant
women and drive State intervention.
Part III demonstrates that applying the construct of the “unborn child” in the
context of New Zealand’s structural inequality, colonial oppression, and
dominant white middle-class notions of family and motherhood
disproportionately impacts Māori women andwomen experiencing poverty. Part
IV highlights the perversity of the State interventions constraining rather than
empowering pregnant women. At the individual level, State oversight infringes
a woman’s right to privacy. At the collective level, the unequal State oversight
imposes an invidious standard for family life and distracts the public from the
broader State supports required for all to improve children’s wellbeing.
Part V argues for a reconstruction of pregnancy intervention to empower all
pregnant women and support families. Two core features of traditional child
protection services, the paramountcy principle and the child rescue model, are
fundamentally incompatible with the autonomy of pregnant women. While this
structure endures, New Zealand will be unable to achieve positive, empowering
intervention within the child protection branch. However, the State’s vexed
relationship with pregnant women cannot be resolved by the State withdrawing
from pregnancy altogether. Reconstruction of State intervention is supported by
12. See Fiona Cram, Poverty, inMĀORI AND SOCIAL ISSUES 156, 156 (Tracey McIntosh & Malcolm
Mulholland eds., 2011.) “Pākehā” is a term used to describe New Zealanders of European descent:Pākehā
MĀORI DICTIONARY, https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?idiom=&phrase=&proverb=&loan=&hist
LoanWords=&keywords=pakeha [https://perma.cc/A6PD-CLPZ].
13. Id. at 156.
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an affirmative concept of the right to privacy, reproductive justice, the Crown’s
obligations under Te Tiriti o Waitangi,
14
and New Zealand’s international treaty
obligations to support family life.
15
I. NEW ZEALAND EXTENDS CHILDCARE AND PROTECTION POWERS TO THE
“UNBORNCHILD”
From 2017 to 2018, Oranga Tamariki received 1,949 separate reports of
concern that an “unborn child” in New Zealand had been, or was likely to be,
harmed, ill-treated, abused, or neglected.
16
Oranga Tamariki took further care
and protection action on 1,235 of these reports of concern and obtained custody
orders for a total of 125 unborn children in New Zealand during that year.
17
This
part traces how New Zealand came to extend its broad, discretionary child
protection powers to the fetus as the “unborn child” and how this extension has
served to obscure the interests of pregnant women in New Zealand.
A. New Zealand’s Mission to Invest in Children and Young People
Oranga Tamariki carries the flag for New Zealand’s mission to invest in its
children and young people. The 2017 establishment of Oranga Tamariki, and
associated amendments to statutory child protection powers, followed a decades-
long struggle over how to ensure the child protection system meets the needs of
all children and families in New Zealand.
18
14. In 1840, representatives of the British Crown signed Te Tiriti o Waitangi, or the Treaty of
Waitangi, with representatives of iwi/tribal groups. The Treaty is New Zealand’s founding constitutional
document and was meant to create a partnership betweenMāori and the British Crown that affirmed Māori
sovereignty and guaranteed collective rights to land and resources. Te Tiriti o Waitangi 1840; see also
Claire Charters & Tracey Whare, Shaky Foundations: The Fundamental Flaw at the Heart of a “Model”
Treaty Involving New Zealand and the IndigenousMāori Community, 34WORLD POLICY J. 11, 11 (2017).
15. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. (ratified 6 April 1993).
16. Letter from Steve Groom, Gen. Manager Pub., Ministerial and Executive Services Oranga
Tamariki, to Ministry for Children (Jan. 29, 2019).
17. Id. Oranga Tamariki initiated a “partnered response” for a further 129 reports that did not meet
the statutory threshold for care and protection but required “family focused case management.” The
custody orders figure includes custody orders under ss 78, 101, 102, 110(2)(a), and 140 of the Oranga
Tamariki Act.
18. State Sector (Ministry for Vulnerable Children, Oranga Tamariki) Order 2016 (N.Z.). When first
established, the Ministry was called the “Ministry for Vulnerable Children, Oranga Tamariki.” The name
was amended to “Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Children” from January 18, 2018, following a public
debate about the stigma of the word “vulnerable.” See, e.g., Craig McCulloch, ‘Vulnerable’ dropped from
Children’s Ministry name, RADIO NEW ZEALAND (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.radionz.
co.nz/news/political/345957/vulnerable-dropped-from-children-s-ministry-name [https://perma.cc/229E-
Y5YB]. The former agency for child protection services—Child, Youth and Family—had been reviewed
almost continuously since 1988, including 14 restructures between 1998 and 2008. See MODERNISING
CHILD, YOUTH AND FAMILY EXPERT PANEL, MODERNISINGCHILD, YOUTHAND FAMILY EXPERT PANEL:
INTERIM REPORT 6 (2015) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT], https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-
msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/evaluation/modernising-cyf/interim-report-expert-panel.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2V8Z-VQ7S].
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New Zealand’s Children’s Commissioner, Judge Andrew Becroft,
diagnosed Child, Youth and Family’s core problem as a failure to understand
and seize the opportunity for radical change laid down in its governing Act, the
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989.
19
The opportunity was
to embrace the Māori worldview and pivot powers on children’s wellbeing as
members of their broader whānau, hapu, iwi, and family groups.
20
This radical
vision was an answer to the groundbreaking 1988 Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Daybreak)
report, which called out the insidious and destructive institutional racism in the
monocultural services of the Department.
21
Puao-Te-Ata-Tu underlined the
system’s “profound misunderstanding or ignorance of the place of the child in
Maori society.”
22
Despite the 1989 Act’s opening for change, a focus on
traditional Pākehā family structures has continued to permeate the practice of
social work.
Concerns about Child, Youth and Family’s performance and impact on
vulnerable children culminated in the April 2015 appointment of an independent
expert panel to lead a “complete overhaul” of the agency.
23
The Modernising
Child, Youth and Family Panel found the care and protection system focused on
managing immediate risk and containing short-term costs instead of working to
support “better lives” for children in the long-term.
24
Overall, children in contact
with the system had significantly worse health, education and incarceration
outcomes as young adults than their peers who had had no contact with Child,
19. OFFICE OF THE CHILDREN’S COMM’R, MAIEA TE TŪRUAPŌ, FULFILLING THE VISION:
SUPPORTING YOUNG PEOPLE WITH AT-RISK BEHAVIOUR TO LIVE SUCCESSFULLY IN THEIR
COMMUNITIES 5 (2018).
20. Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 (N.Z) [hereinafter the “1989 Act”].
“Family group” is defined in the 1989 Act to mean an extended family with at least one adult member
“with whom the child or young person has a biological or legal relationship” or “to whom the child or
young person has a significant psychological attachment,” or that is the child’s or young person’s whānau
or other culturally recognized family groups.” Id. at pt. 2(1). In general, “Iwi” is defined as an “extended
kinship group, tribe, nation, people, nationality, race – often refers to a large group of people descended
from a common ancestor and associated with a distinct territory.” IWI, MĀORI DICTIONARY,
https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?idiom=&phrase=&proverb=&loan=&histLoanWords=&keywords=
iwi [https://perma.cc/4VPR-YPCL]. “Hapū” is defined as a “kinship group, clan, tribe, subtribe – section
of a large kinship group and the primary political unit in traditional Māori society.” In traditional society
a hapū “consisted of a number of whānau sharing descent from a common ancestor” and “[a] number of
related hapū usually shared adjacent territories forming a looser tribal federation (iwi).” HAPŪ, MĀORI
DICTIONARY, https://maoridictionary.co.nz/search?idiom=&phrase=&proverb=&loan=&histLoanWords
=&keywords=hapu [https://perma.cc/WL7L-CVVT].
21. THEMAORI PERSPECTIVEADVISORYCOMM., PUAO-TE-ATA-TU (DAYBREAK): THEREPORT OF
THE MINISTERIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON A MAORI PERSPECTIVE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE 19 (1988), https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resour
ces/archive/1988-puaoteatatu.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8LC-5C6U].
22. Id. at 7.
23. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 18, at 5; Independent Expert Panel to Lead Major CYF Overhaul,
NEW ZEALAND GOV’T (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/independent-expert-panel-
lead-major-cyf-overhaul [https://perma.cc/6XVA-GELC].
24. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 18, at 79.
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Youth and Family.
25
Children who had been in the care of Child, Youth and
Family experienced re-abuse and re-victimization at an appalling rate, with
anecdotal evidence of significant victimization of children while they were in the
State’s care.
26
The Panel recommended a bold overhaul to shift the system’s
focus to the child and their need for a stable and loving home.
27
The
recommended changes included establishing a new department (now Oranga
Tamariki) as a single point of accountability with an expanded mandate to
support long-term outcomes.
28
Oranga Tamariki is defined by a child-centered “investment approach” to
protective services.
29
The investment approach looks to future long-term
outcomes of public spending and services and relies increasingly on data to
measure returns on those investments.
30
The approach favors an intense delivery
of child protection services at the earliest possible opportunity with two payoffs
in mind: first, the social benefits of improved life outcomes for children in
contact with the service; and second, the fiscal benefits to the State through
avoided lifetime costs in the social welfare, justice and health systems and
productivity gain in the private sphere.
31
The shift to an investment focus is part
of a broader social investment agenda between 2011 to 2017 under New
Zealand’s National Party-led governments.
32
B. Oranga Tamariki and the State’s Broad, Discretionary Child Protection
Powers
The Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 sets out the Ministry’s care and protection
powers.
33
The Act is New Zealand’s primary care and protection statute and aims
25. Id. at 8. For children born in 1990 and 1991, administrative data showed that by age 21 the
children who were “known” to the care and protection system were twice as likely to have left school
without at least a Level 2 NCEA qualification, seven times more likely to have been subsequently referred
to Child, Youth and Family by the Police for youth offending, more than twice as likely to be in receipt
of social welfare benefit and nine times more likely to receive a custodial sentence in the adult corrections
system. Id. at 36. “NCEA,” or the “National Certificate of Educational Achievement” is the main national
qualification for secondary school students in New Zealand. How NCEA Works, NEW ZEALAND
QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY, https://www.nzqa.govt.nz/ncea/understanding-ncea/how-ncea-works/
[https://perma.cc/2PUN-PGUV].
26. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 18, at 7.
27. Id. at 20.
28. Id. at 15.
29. MINISTRY FOR VULNERABLE CHILDREN, ORANGA TAMARIKI, STRATEGIC INTENTIONS 2017-
2022, at 19 (2017), https://www.orangatamariki.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Documents/Strategic-Intentions-
2017-2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MCA-XH9L].
30. FINALREPORT, supra note 1, at 31, 39.
31. FINALREPORT, supra note 1, at 10 and 16.
32. See Tom Baker & Simone Cooper, New Zealand’s Social Investment Experiment, 38 CRITICAL
SOC. POL’Y 428, 429 (2018). The social investment agenda has been criticized for prioritizing the easy-
to-measure fiscal outcomes and its relationship to “data-driven governance.” Id. at 434.
33. To carry out recommendations of the Expert Panel, Parliament amended the 1989 Act in two
main branches of reform: the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Advocacy, Workforce, and
Age Settings) Amendment Act 2016 and the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Oranga
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“to promote the well-being of children, young persons and their families and
family groups.”
34
To understand how New Zealand’s care and protection model
disproportionately impacts women who fall outside the dominant norms of
“good” motherhood, it is necessary to introduce three core features of the Oranga
Tamariki child protection system. First, the “paramountcy principle” guides all
decision making under the Oranga Tamariki Act; second, the trigger for Oranga
Tamariki intervention is a “report of concern” from any person in New Zealand;
third, this trigger initiates a formal Oranga Tamariki response framework
consisting of mandatory statutory duties and discretionary assessments of need.
The “paramountcy principle” guides all decision making under the Oranga
Tamariki Act. The paramountcy principle requires that in all matters relating to
the application of the Act the “welfare and interests of the child or young person
shall be the first and paramount consideration.”
35
As I will outline in Part II, this
principle is a critical move to privilege the child in the relationship between State
and family.
The trigger for Oranga Tamariki care and protection intervention is a report
of concern under Section 15 of the Act. A report of concern is a report to the
agency that a child or young person has been, or is likely to be, harmed, ill-
treated, abused, neglected or deprived.
36
The reports of concern triggering the
Ministry’s powers may be made in respect of a “child or young person,” meaning
“a person under the age of 14 years.”
37
“Any person” may make a report of
concern; the notifier may be anyone from a family member, to a neighbor, to a
police officer responding to an incident at the family home.
38
In practice, government agencies are responsible for a significant proportion
of the reports of concern: in 2017, seventy-five percent of reports of concern
gave from notifiers in the category Court, education, police, health or “other
government.”
39
A further 6.2 percent came from non-government organizations
Tamariki) Legislation Act 2017. The changes included renaming the 1989 Act with the alternative titles
“the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989” and “the Children’s and Young People’s Well-being Act of 1989.”
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Oranga Tamariki) Legislation Act 2017, Section 5 (N.Z.).
Some changes came into force after the Legislation Act received the royal assent; others are being brought
into force by Order in Council on different dates, but no later than July 1, 2019. Id. at Section 2.
34 Oranga Tamariki Act 1989, Section 4 (N.Z.) [hereinafter Oranga Tamariki Act], http://www.legis
lation.govt.nz/act/public/1989/0024/127.0/DLM147088.html [https://perma.cc/P79F-FAQ3.]
35. Id. Section 6.
36. Id. Section 15.
37. Id. Sections 2(1), 15. “Young person” has different meanings in different parts of the Act but is
essentially a person over the age of 14 and under the age of 18 years.
38. Certain organizations, including school boards, District Health Boards, and the New Zealand
Police, are required to adopt, report on and require a “child protection policy” on how to identify and
report child abuse and neglect under Section 15 of the Oranga Tamariki Act. See Children’s Act 2014
(N.Z.), http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2014/0040/latest/DLM5501618.html [https://perma.cc/
5QZT-FQD4].
39. M. DUNCANSON ET. AL., supra note 11, at 29.
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and 8.9 percent from family.
40
This means that the entry point into the Oranga
Tamariki system is the judgment by a person in a government agency, family or
community that a child’s wellbeing may be at risk and a decision to bring that
judgment to the attention of Oranga Tamariki.
Once Oranga Tamariki receives a report of concern, its care and protection
powers follow a mix of discretionary assessments and mandatory actions.
Oranga Tamariki is required to arrange an investigation into a report of concern
if it appears “necessary or desirable,” but has a broad discretion to determine
what is “necessary or desirable” in a given case.
41
Oranga Tamariki must
progress the investigation if it “reasonably believes that the child or young
person is in need of care or protection,”
42
but again has the discretion to form a
reasonable belief around whether the child or young person meets the definition
of being in “need of care or protection” in Section 14 of the Act.
43
The broad definition of “need of care and protection” includes where a child
or young person is being, or is likely to be physically, emotionally or sexually
harmed, where the child’s “development or physical or mental or emotional well-
being” is being impaired or neglected in a serious and avoidable manner, and
where the child’s parents or guardians are unwilling or unable to care for them.
44
It is important to note the standards of “harm,” “ill-treatment,” “abuse,” and
“neglect” are not defined in the Act.
45
The concepts are applied on the assessment
of the notifier making a report of concern, the Oranga Tamariki staff member
determining the appropriate response to that report, and ultimately the family
group conference or Court making a decision about how to proceed to protect
the child.
46
As I will argue in Part III, these subjective assessments are vulnerable
to personal bias and racist or classist preferences.
If an Oranga Tamariki officer forms a reasonable belief that a child is in need
of care and protection, they must notify a care and protection coordinator, who
will convene a family group conference.
47
The family group conference will then
consider the needs of the child and make decisions, recommendations and plans
for their care and protection.
48
Oranga Tamariki is required to consider the
40. Id.
41. Oranga Tamariki Act, Section 17.
42. Id. at Section 17(2).
43. Id. at Section 14.
44. Id. at Section 14(1)(a), (b) and (f).
45. For the agency’s general guidance to notifiers on how to identify and respond to abuse in a family,
seeORANGATAMARIKI—MINISTRY FORCHILDREN, Identify Abuse, https://www.orangatamariki.govt.nz/
identify-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/EKR4-9ZB4].
46. See MARK HENAGHAN ET.AL, FAMILY LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 6.558 (17th ed. 2015) for an
overview of how the New Zealand Courts interpret and apply the care and protection standard in Section
14 of the Oranga Tamariki Act.
47. Oranga Tamariki Act, at Sections 17-18.
48. Id. at Sections 28–29.
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decisions, recommendations or plan and give effect to them by providing
services and resources under the Act.
49
Following the investigation and family group conference process, Oranga
Tamariki may decide to turn to the Family Court to apply for a declaration that
the child or young person is in need of care or protection.
50
The Court will only
grant such a declaration if satisfied that it is not practicable or appropriate to
provide care or protection to the child by other means, including by the
implementation of the family group conference plan.
51
Where the Court makes
the declaration that the child is in need of care or protection, it may then make
one of the varied orders in Part 2 of the Act, including orders for services and
assistance, support, and for the custody of the child.
52
Oranga Tamariki is making these discretionary assessments of the critical
care and protection needs of children and young people in the context of a
perceived crisis of child wellbeing in New Zealand. In recent high-profile child
abuse cases, the public and news media have been quick to condemn Oranga
Tamariki and its predecessors for failing to act and letting children slip through
the net.
53
C. New Zealand Courts Extend Child Protection Powers to the Fetus as
“Unborn Child”
Though the Oranga Tamariki Act care and protection powers apply in
respect of a “child” defined as “a person under the age of 14 years,”
54
from 1995
the New Zealand courts have extended these protections to the fetus. In the first
key decisions to raise this issue the courts have accepted that the child protection
branch of government is empowered to respond to concerns about the wellbeing
of a fetus (deemed an “unborn child”) and that the court may grant protective
orders over the “unborn child,” including orders formally placing the “unborn
child” in the custody of the State.
55
The first decision to raise the question of whether care and protection powers
apply before birth is In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child).
56
The Department
of Social Welfare (a predecessor to Oranga Tamariki) brought a “novel
49. Id. at Section 34. There is an exception if the Chief Executive considers the decisions,
recommendations or plan to be impracticable, unreasonable or clearly inconsistent with the principles of
the Act. Id. at Section 34(1).
50. Id. at Section 67.
51. Id. at Section 73.
52. Id. at Section 83.
53. See, e.g., Edward Gay, Child, Youth and Family Blind to Moko Warning Signs, RADIO NEW
ZEALAND (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/346133/child-youth-and-family-
blind-to-moko-warning-signs [https://perma.cc/H7AA-N688].
54. Oranga Tamariki Act at Section 2(1).
55. Id.
56. In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child) [1995] NZFLR 577 (FC).
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application” to the Family Court for a care and protection order over the “unborn
child” of a 15-year-old girl (referred to throughout the judgment as “the
mother”)
57
who was already in the custody and guardianship of the
Department.
58
The mother had been in a violent relationship with “H,” the father
of Baby P. Judge Inglis observed that, “the relationship persisted” despite this
violence, including a reported incident of H hitting the mother’s stomach when
he knew she was pregnant.
59
Judge Inglis quoted his previous assessment of the
relationship in the care and protection proceedings for the mother: “It is quite
clear to any sensible person that there is no hope whatever for their relationship
but of course [the mother] is too immature to understand the dangers, which to
any sensible adult are totally obvious.”
60
The question before the Court was whether “Baby P” was a “child” as
defined in the Children, Young, Persons and Their Families Act 1989.
61
Judge
Inglis emphasized that whether the Court should exercise its care and protection
powers in respect of the unborn child was a matter of discretion rather than
jurisdiction.
62
The only New Zealand case with any bearing on the issue was R v
Henderson,
63
a decision on appeal fromMr. Henderson’s criminal conviction for
causing the death of an unborn child. The Court held that the fetus, which had
been estimated to be at 26 weeks maturity, had been an “unborn child” for the
purposes of the Crimes Act and there was no need to require the Crown to prove
that the child was capable of being born alive.
64
Just as the Crimes Act protected the life of the unborn child, the Children,
Young Persons, and Their Families Act could be interpreted “in light of modern
medical and physiological knowledge” to provide a different kind of protection
for that unborn child in the child protection system.
65
Judge Inglis was satisfied
57. Id. at 578.
58. Id. at 583.
59. Id. at 583.
60. Id. at 583.
61. Id. at 578. At the time of the judgment the definition was “boy or girl under the age of 14 years,”
Section 2(1). On July 14, 2017 “boy or girl” was replaced with “a person.” Children, Young Persons, and
Their Families (Oranga Tamariki) Legislation Act 2017, supra note 33, at Section 7(2).
62. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 580.
63. R v Henderson [1990] 3 NZLR 174 (CA). In Baby P, Judge Inglis also outlined two English
decisions, In re D (A Minor) [1987] AC 317 (CA) and In re F (in utero) [1988] 2 WLR 1288 (CA), but
with the proviso that “overseas cases are of no direct help except to the extent that they indicate how
similar problems have been resolved within a different statutory or common law context.” Baby P, [1995]
NZFLR at 58.
64. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 583.
65. Id. Here the Judge was referring to a passage of the 1977 Report of the Royal Commission of
Inquiry into Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion (quoted in R v Henderson, [1990] 3 NZLR at 181,
and repeated in Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 582) that observed “It may now be said that it is inaccurate to
speak of the child having an independent circulation only after birth, when in fact it is firmly established
that a child has an independent circulation while still within the womb and that severing of the navel cord
separates the child from the placenta, not the body of its mother.” NEW ZEALAND ROYAL COMMISSION
ON CONTRACEPTION, STERILISATION AND ABORTION, CONTRACEPTION, STERILISATION AND ABORTION
IN NEW ZEALAND: REPORT OF THE ROYALCOMMISSION OF INQUIRY 279 (1997).
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that “child” could include “at least an unborn child which has achieved a state of
development where it could survive independently of the mother.”
66
The Judge exercised his discretion to grant the declaration and vested the
interim custody of the “unborn child” in the Director-General of Social
Welfare.
67
He suggested it would be difficult to think of “a more appropriate
case” for exercising the jurisdiction, noting that Baby P “requires protection not
only from his violent father but also from his mother’s immaturity and apparent
infatuation with the father.”
68
The orders would provide Baby P with protection
during birth as an extension of the agency’s existing protection of the mother.
Fundamentally, In the matter of Baby P sets up the unborn child question as
a moment for the Court to demonstrate its commitment to the protective
jurisdiction under the radical reforms of the 1989 Act. This commitment is clear
in Judge Inglis’s description of the particular local context of a jurisdiction
designed to provide care and protection for the powerless and his reliance on the
principle of the paramountcy of the child’s welfare and interests.
69
This commitment to the Court’s protective jurisdiction continued in a second
decision, Re an Unborn Child.
70
Here the Department of Child, Youth and
Family Services (another predecessor to Oranga Tamariki) applied to the High
Court for an order under the Guardianship Act 1968 to place the unborn child
under the guardianship of the Court.
71
Justice Heath described the facts giving
rise to the application as “truly extraordinary.”
72
The pregnant woman “Nikki”
and her producer appeared on a national television documentary to share their
plans to use footage from the birth of Nikki’s child in a pornographic film.
73
The
Department’s chief social worker met with Nikki and the producer and attempted
to reach an undertaking that they would not feature images of the baby in the
film. After the meeting was unsuccessful, the chief social worker applied to the
Court to place the “unborn child” under the guardianship of the Court.
74
Justice Heath in the High Court held that the term “child” in the
Guardianship Act could include an “unborn child.”
75
He saw two difficulties
with the reasoning of Judge Inglis in Re Baby P. First, Justice Heath held that the
issue could not be a matter of discretion rather than jurisdiction to exercise the
66. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 583.
67. Id. at 584.
68. Id. at 584.
69. Id. at 581.
70. Re an Unborn Child, [2003] 1 NZLR 115 (HC).
71. Id. at 1. The Guardianship Act contains different powers to the care and protection functions
under the then Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 (now named the Oranga Tamariki
Act 1989), but the Judge held the interpretation of “child” in the Guardianship Act would be equally
applicable to the 1989 Act. Id. at 50.
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Id. at 63. As noted above the Judge explicitly stated this interpretation would be equally
applicable to the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, at 50.
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Court’s powers in respect of the unborn child: for there to be any power to
exercise, the Court had to be satisfied that the object of jurisdiction—here, the
fetus—fell within the definition of “child” in the statute providing those
powers.
76
Second, Justice Heath was concerned that Judge Inglis had reached the
view that Baby P was a “child” within the meaning of the Act primarily on his
own judgment that Baby P was at a stage of development that should fall within
the definition.
77
Ultimately, Justice Heath arrived at the same answer as In the matter of Baby
P “by a different route.”
78
The Judge had regard to New Zealand’s obligations
under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, in particular the
preamble statement that the child “by reason of his physical and mental
immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal
protection, before as well as after birth.”
79
The Judge further relied on elements
of New Zealand law that supported the interests of the “unborn child to varying
degrees,” such as the regulation of abortion and the criminal offence of “killing
unborn child.”
80
Having found that the Act’s jurisdiction extended to an “unborn child,” the
Judge considered that it would be a matter of discretion whether to exercise the
jurisdiction in an individual case.
81
Discretion would allow the Court to focus on
the “utility and need for such orders” and avoid the “otherwise impossible” task
of “endeavouring to determine the precise moment in time (for legal purposes)
that an unborn child is subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.”
82
Justice Heath
recorded briefly that the decision on whether to make an order would “no doubt”
be impacted by the stage of pregnancy involved and the “(general) inability” of
the Court to compel a mother to do something against her will in respect of her
fetus.
83
On the facts before the Court, Justice Heath was satisfied that there was a
likely risk of emotional harm to the unborn child from sexual exploitation of its
image in the planned film and that it was necessary for the Court to intervene.
The Judge emphasized his concerns that Nikki was not putting her own interests
before the interests of her unborn child: he opined that her desire to be a star had
overridden her judgment, and that there was nothing to suggest she had given
76. Id. at 54.
77. Id. at 55.
78. Id. at 56, 63.
79. Id. at 61 (emphasis added); Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 15 (quoting G.A.
Res. 1386 (XIV), Declaration of the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1959)); see also Anjori Mitra, “We’re
Always Going to Argue about Abortion”—International Law’s Changing Attitudes Towards Abortion, 1
N.Z. WOMEN’S L.J. 142, 152 (2017) (discussing the debate and compromise regarding the references to
the “unborn” in the Convention and the ambiguity of “appropriate legal protection”).
80. Re an Unborn Child, [2003] 1 NZLR at [61]; Crimes Act 1961, Section 182.
81. Id. at [63].
82. Id.
83. Id.
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more than a “passing thought” to the possibility of adverse effects on the unborn
child.
84
He doubted Nikki’s own statement that she was concerned about the
unborn child’s safety, health, and best interests, noting that she had not explained
her thought process to conclude the unborn child would not be harmed by being
associated with the pornographic film.
85
Justice Heath placed Nikki’s “unborn
child” in the guardianship of the Court and issued various injunctions prohibiting
filming of the labor.
86
Just as the mother in In the matter of Baby P could not be trusted to act like
a sensible adult in her relationship with the violent father of Baby P, Nikki could
not be trusted to prioritize the interests of her unborn child in deciding whether
and how to feature her labor in the pornographic film. In these circumstances,
the Court saw itself as obliged to step in to lift up the interests of the fetus and
protect this powerless subject from harm.
The final key decision extending care and protection powers to the “unborn
child” is the 2018 judgment of L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki—
Ministry for Vulnerable Children.
87
A family member of the pregnant woman,
Ms. T, and the Oranga Tamariki social worker for Ms. T and Mr. L’s older child
made reports of concern in respect of the unborn child. The reports raised Ms.
T’s allegedly poor mental health and the fact that Ms. T’s five older children had
been removed from her care.
88
On receipt of the reports of concern, Oranga
Tamariki commenced an investigation under Section 17 of the Oranga Tamariki
Act.
89
In the High Court the applicants sought orders essentially preventing Oranga
Tamariki from“harassing” or “persecuting” them or from sending social workers
to their home.
90
Justice Muir was required to consider whether the statutory
powers of Oranga Tamariki extended to an “unborn child.” The Judge concluded
that the Oranga Tamariki care and protection powers and responsibilities to
receive and respond to reports of concern were not restricted to “children who
have been born.”
91
Justice Muir favored a focus on the “utility and need” of intervention in a
given case in the Court’s discretion.
92
The utility and need to investigate any
report of concern received before birth was “inescapable.” The Judge considered
that the contrary conclusion requiring Oranga Tamariki to wait until the birth of
84. Id. at [82].
85. Id. at [79].
86. Id. at [109].
87. L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Vulnerable Children, [2018] NZHC.
88. Id. at [12].
89. Id. at [13].
90. Id. at [3].
91. Id. at [27].
92. Id. at [32], [35].
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the child to take action would frustrate the paramountcy principle and the Act’s
overarching purpose of promoting the wellbeing of children.
93
Overall, the New Zealand courts have framed the “unborn child” cases as
exceptional decisions to protect the welfare of the particular “unborn child”
before the Court and avoided making any general statement about when a fetus
becomes a “child.” In In the matter of Baby P, Judge Inglis suggested that the
English decision of Re F (in utero)was valuable in providing compelling reasons
why a discretion to intervene to protect an “unborn child” should be used
“cautiously, sparingly, and only in exceptional cases.”
94
Justice Heath in Re an
Unborn Child similarly emphasized that the Court would not lightly override
parental decisions, particularly in decisions over an unborn child where “nobody
but the mother has any real control.”
95
Yet the courts’ reasoning does not confine permissible State intervention
over the “unborn child” to care and protection action on formal orders approved
by the court. In practice, the State’s intervention in the “unborn child” begins
with the reports of concern and investigations that precede a family group
conference or formal application for court orders under the Act. The power (and
duty) to receive and investigate reports of concern hinges on the courts’
acceptance in these key cases that the term “child” in the Oranga Tamariki Act
can include an “unborn child.”
96
This acceptance activates the care and
protection system for all “unborn children”: once Oranga Tamariki receives any
report of concern about an unborn child, it is not only permitted, but statutorily
mandated, to follow the same investigation process that it would for any child or
young person post-birth. The courts’ emphasis on a discretionary judicial
consideration of the woman’s interests and stage of pregnancy has been at the
expense of any clear, unambiguous guidance about when and how Oranga
Tamariki should exercise these prior care and protection powers over a pregnant
woman. This prior permissible phase of State intervention is the real legacy of
the “unborn child” cases.
D. Oranga Tamariki Investment Model Doubles Down on Interventions
Before Birth
The new Oranga Tamariki investment model for early intervention doubles
down on the accepted State interest in the “unborn child” and duty to protect that
93. Id. at [34].
94. In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child), [1995] NZFLR 577 (FC) at 581 (citing Re F (in utero)
[1988] 2 WLR 128 (CA)).
95. Re an Unborn child, [2003] 1 NZLR at [61], [73], [88].
96. Interestingly, the courts have avoided explicitly stating that “child” includes “unborn child.” The
closest direct statement is in L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Vulnerable Children,
[2018] NZHC at [36-37] where Justice Muir states that he does not accept “child” must be confined to
those who have been born.
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“unborn child” through its focus on prevention and support services that begin
before birth.
97
Pre-birth intervention is not just permitted, but encouraged and
prioritized as a central feature of the agency’s model.
Oranga Tamariki encourages early intervention services before birth to
identify families at risk of poor life outcomes and address those risk factors to
ensure that children thrive.
98
“Early” intervention can begin as early as pre-20
weeks’ gestation, although the Oranga Tamariki practice centre advises that a
formal referral to family group conference or application for court orders should
be delayed until after 20 weeks for the reason that there would then be “less
chance of something going wrong in the pregnancy.”
99
The Oranga Tamariki practice centre identifies pre-birth as a time in a
woman and future child’s life that presents a “unique opportunity” to work with
whānau and other professionals. The State has identified that its duties under the
new model include working with whānau to provide intense support
mechanisms: supporting ante-natal health and alcohol, drug and smoking
abstinence efforts, engaging with fathers, and identifying wider whānau
strengths and resources to support the newborn. The services aim to maximize
the opportunity to mobilize support systems within the family, whānau and
community, give the parents the time to demonstrate change before birth, and
support parents to meet basic needs of the child at birth.
100
The work also includes monitoring specific women and families with a view
to assessing the expectant parent or parents’ capacity to care for a child, their
willingness to address any concerns raised by Oranga Tamariki, and their ability
to make any changes that Oranga Tamariki considers necessary before birth to
provide a safe, healthy environment for the child.
101
For example, Oranga
Tamariki might visit the expectant parent or parents’ home, speak with family or
whānau about possible support systems, review any prior history with care and
protection services, and seek information about parental substance abuse or
mental health issues.
The Oranga Tamariki early intervention model presents a paradox. A good
State would indeed support women in constrained circumstances to ensure that
they have the best material and personal circumstances to decide whether to carry
their pregnancy to term. Such support furthers the State’s interest in the health
and wellbeing of both the pregnant woman and her fetus. However, as I will
argue below, delivering these interventions through the child protection branch
of government under the overarching imperative to prioritize the interests of the
97. See State Sector (Ministry for Vulnerable Children, Oranga Tamariki) Order 2016 (N.Z.), supra
note 18, at 20.
98. Id. at 28.
99. ORANGA TAMARIKI PRACTICE CENTRE, supra note 5.
100. Id.
101. ORANGA TAMARIKI PRACTICE CENTRE, supra note 5.
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child perversely operates to constrain the pregnant woman rather than empower
her.
II. FRAMING FETUS AS “UNBORNCHILD” OBSCURES PREGNANTWOMEN AND
DRIVES STATE INTERVENTION
Framing the fetus as an “unborn child” serves to obscure pregnant women
and drive State intervention. This Part sets out how the courts adopt the term
“unborn child” and move between two different senses of the fetus as a child:
the fetus as a child itself (albeit unborn) and the fetus as a future child. The
“unborn child” frame sets up a continuum between the unborn and born child
that drives the State to extend its well-established obligation to make the welfare
and interests of the child its first and paramount consideration. This framing
obscures the pregnant woman and leads the State to subordinate her interests to
those of the fetus.
From the first New Zealand decision to address the State’s care and
protection powers before birth, the courts and the State have favored the term
“unborn child” to describe the fetus. Judge Inglis began his judgment in In the
matter of Baby P (an unborn child) by explaining that he would speak of the
“baby” as an “unborn child” following Lord Denning, “who characteristically
avoided any attempt at euphemism” by speaking in “simple English” of the
“unborn child inside the mother’s womb.”
102
The “unborn child” term is carried
through subsequent decisions and the Oranga Tamariki practice materials refer
to “unborn babies.”
103
Recently, an amendment to the Oranga Tamariki Act to
create specific care and protection provisions for “subsequent children”
explicitly defined the new term “subsequent child” as “a child, born or
unborn.”
104
The courts move between two different senses of the term “unborn child.”
The first sense is the fetus as a child itself, albeit unborn. This sense underlies
Judge Inglis’s humanizing descriptions of “Baby P” as “a little boy in good
health” and as “a young human being at a present stage of development where
he could now live independently of the mother.”
105
The fetus is presented as an
existing child in need of protection from a present risk of harm: Judge Inglis
102. In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child), [1995] NZFLR 577 (FC) at 578 (citing Royal College
of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] AC 801 at 802).
103. Id.; see also L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Vulnerable Children, [2018]
NZHC; ORANGA TAMARIKI PRACTICE CENTRE, supra note 5.
104. Oranga Tamariki Act 1989, Section 2(1) definition of “subsequent child” (emphasis added).
Unfortunately the regime is outside the scope of this Note, but it essentially creates a reverse onus for
parents who have had older children removed from their care by the Courts with a finding that there is
“no realistic prospect” that the children will be returned to their care: Section 18B. If the parent(s) have a
subsequent child they bear an onus to show that they are unlikely to inflict harm on their child:
Section 18A(3)-(5).
105. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 578.
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questions why such “unborn children” should be any less protected by the State
than other children.
106
The second sense is the fetus as “future child” or “the child who will be but
is not yet born.”
107
Justice Muir in L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki
focuses on the need for protection of this future child when he declares the
inescapable need for proper investigation “in advance of the birth of the child”
in order for Oranga Tamariki to be ready to protect against any harm or neglect
at birth.
108
In essence, this “future child” framing looks at pre-birth action as
necessary to promote post-birth interests.
Neither sense of the “unborn child” turns on the viability of the fetus.
Judge Inglis initially relied on viability in In the matter of Baby P (an Unborn
Child) by holding the “child” term could “at least” include an “unborn child,”
such as Baby P, at a stage of development where it could survive independently
of the mother.
109
In Re an Unborn Child Justice Heath doubted the utility of the
focus on viability and preferred an interpretation that avoided the need to
determine a precise point in time where the jurisdiction would fall on an “unborn
child.”
110
The judge contended that “endless arguments” over the stage at which
an unborn child becomes a child would serve no useful purpose and that the stage
of pregnancy should instead impact what order would be appropriate in a given
case.
Once the fetus is framed as an “unborn child,” it is a short step to accept that
Oranga Tamariki—the care and protection agency responsible for the care and
protection of children and young people—has an interest in that fetus. The
“child” description effectively sets up a continuum between the unborn and the
born child where it would be nearly impossible to draw a clear line between the
two and thus unjust to deny one the protection that the State guarantees to the
other.
111
In this light, the State’s interest in the “unborn child” is a product of
protection and pragmatism. Oranga Tamariki has a well-established
responsibility to advance the wellbeing of children and to assist children to
prevent them from suffering harm.
112
From this starting point, the courts are loath
to withhold the Act’s critical protection from the “unborn child.” Oranga
Tamariki and the courts dismiss rigid distinctions between birth and pre-birth as
cumbersome barriers to the pragmatic application of available tools to achieve
what is perceived as the best outcome for the fetus. Judge Inglis suggests that
106. Id. at 579.
107. ROSAMUND SCOTT, RIGHTS, DUTIES AND THE BODY: LAW AND ETHICS OF THE MATERNAL-
FETALCONFLICT 23 (Hart Publishing, 2002).
108. L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Vulnerable Children, [2018] NZHC at
[27] and [34].
109. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 583.
110. Re an Unborn Child, [2003] 1 NZLR at [63]–[64].
111. See id. at [66].
112. Oranga Tamariki Act, Section 4.
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there is nothing to indicate that unborn children “should to any less extent be
protected from harm, be entitled to have their rights upheld, or be entitled to have
their welfare promoted.”
113
It would be “artificial and pointless” to wait until the
birth of the child.
114
Framing the fetus as an “unborn child” uplifts the interests of the fetus as
“child” and obscures the pregnant woman in a manner that reinforces the
pragmatic application of the Oranga Tamariki Act. The Oranga Tamariki Act
framework provides a clear, strong direction for the courts and Oranga Tamariki
to make the welfare and interests of a child the paramount consideration.
115
The
force of the paramountcy principle contrasts with the ambiguous, ill-defined
competing autonomy or privacy interests of the pregnant woman. The courts
have made oblique references to the “rights of the mother”
116
and the “(general)
inability of the court to make orders which compel a mother to do something
against her will.”
117
But the courts have not ventured further to unpack those
rights in any depth or to interrogate when and how the pregnant woman’s
interests deviate from those of the fetus.
The dominating focus on the “unborn child” as a separate subject of the
court’s jurisdiction overshadows the pregnant woman’s interests. The “unborn
child” becomes the primary, or even the only, subject of the court’s jurisdiction,
which stems from its powers to protect vulnerable children. The pregnant woman
is a far less salient character in this dynamic. She is a potential source of harm to
the child and therefore a potential subject of the Court’s order, but ultimately she
is peripheral to the court’s responsibility towards her fetus.
III. DISCRETIONARY “UNBORNCHILD” INTERVENTIONS DISPROPORTIONATELY
IMPACTWOMEN EXPERIENCING POVERTY AND INDIGENOUSMĀORIWOMEN
The discretionary “unborn child” interventions target a marginalized subset
of the population. In this Part, I theorize and establish that using the report of
concern triggers to apply broad discretionary child protection powers in a society
of structural inequality and dominant white middle-class norms of good
motherhood disproportionately impacts women experiencing poverty and Māori
women.
While Oranga Tamariki routinely claims an interest in the fetus when it
responds to reports of concern before birth, it is unlikely to claim this routine
interest evenly across all parts of the population. The child protection model is
neither neutral nor universal, but instead targets a marginalized subset of the
113. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 579.
114. Id. at 584.
115. Oranga Tamariki Act, Section 6.
116. Baby P, [1995] NZFLR at 584.
117. Re an Unborn Child, [2003] 1 NZLR at [64].
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population. The targeted subset is determined first by which children are subject
to the reports of concern that activate the State’s powers and later by the State’s
assessment of whether the child is in “need of care or protection” in the sense of
being (or being likely to be) “harmed,” “ill-treated,” “abused,” or “seriously
deprived.”
118
These are not objective standards. They reflect the norms of the
decision makers and are vulnerable to classist and racist preferences.
119
Oranga Tamariki applies the discretionary child protection model before
birth in a society of structural inequality and dominant white middle class norms
of good motherhood. “Good” motherhood norms center on the individual woman
as a primary caregiver, separated from the collective resources and support of
her broader family group or whānau. They include the expectation that a woman
be a chaste, responsible, protective carer who puts her child first.
120
Such norms
are peppered throughout the “unborn child cases.” In In the matter of Baby P, we
see Judge Inglis’s rigid expectations for the young pregnant woman to keep
herself and her fetus safe from her abusive partner.
121
In Re an Unborn Child,
we hear Justice Heath’s concern that the pregnant woman, Nikki, might be
failing to selflessly prioritize her fetus’s interests over her desire for fame.
122
Oranga Tamariki is more likely to oversee the pregnancies of women
experiencing poverty. The 2015 review of child protection services in New
Zealand recorded that most families of children referred to the agency had “high
levels of long-term need and disadvantage,” including long-term unemployment
and low income.
123
In the cohort of children born in New Zealand between 2005
and 2007, 46 percent had parents living in a high deprivation area at the time of
their birth.
124
The relationship between poverty and involvement with Oranga Tamariki
can in part be explained by the fact that families experiencing poverty are likely
to have greater contact with other government agencies. In the 2015 review, 39
percent of the children known to Child, Youth and Family by age five had a
mother who had been receiving a benefit for more than four of the five years
118. Oranga Tamariki Act, Sections 17(2), 14(1)(a).
119. Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 114, 158
(2011); see also Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 683, 788 (2001).
120. Simran Dhunna, Beverley Lawton & Fiona Cram, An Affront to Her Mana: Young Māori
Mothers Experiences of Intimate Partner Violence, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1, 7 (2018).
121. See FAMILY VIOLENCE DEATH REVIEW COMMITTEE, FIFTH REPORT JANUARY 2014 TO
DECEMBER 2015F 57 (2016) for a critique of how family violence policies hold mothers responsible for
“failing to protect” their children from intimate partner violence in which they are a victim.
122. Re an Unborn Child, [2003] 1 NZLR.
123. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 18, at 32.
124. Id. at 32–33. The report does not define “high deprivation,” but since 1991 New Zealand has
run a New Zealand index of deprivation following each census, which reflects eight dimensions of
material and social deprivation: communication (access to the Internet at home), income, employment,
qualifications, home ownership, support, living space and transport). See M. DUNCANSON ET AL., CHILD
POVERTY MONITOR TECHNICAL REPORT (N.Z. Child & Youth Epidemiology Serv. ed., 2018),
http://www.nzchildren.co.nz/ [https://perma.cc/25M5-RVVS].
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prior to their birth.
125
Almost 60 percent had a primary caregiver on a benefit at
the time of birth. As noted in Part I, contact with government agencies creates
an opportunity for the agency to enter and supervise family life and may
culminate in reports of concern.
The relationship between poverty and Oranga Tamariki oversight can also
reflect a judgment that poor women are not good mothers. This judgment may
come from the notifier making a report of concern to trigger Oranga Tamariki
intervention, the Oranga Tamariki staff member deciding that a care and
protection investigation is necessary, or the Court making orders in respect of
the child. In the United States, Professor Dorothy Roberts, acclaimed scholar in
race, gender, and the law, has identified how the contemporary child welfare
system confuses poverty with neglect and maintains a fundamental division
between poor and other families.
126
Professor Khiara Bridges has further
emphasized how in public obstetrics care poverty “is presumed to indicate the
absence of a moral vigilance that might manifest in harm to [a pregnant
woman’s] child.”
127
Bridges shines a light on how poverty “is thought to index
a moral permissiveness, the magnitude of which the state has the duty to
determine and upon which the health and safety of the woman’s unborn child
hinges.”
128
Arguably, poverty is one indicator of vulnerability and need for the services
that Oranga Tamariki can provide to support families. Yet the problem with this
justification for targeted intervention is that Oranga Tamariki assessments and
statutory services are indeed premised on a series of judgments about parenting
and whether the child or young person is in need of care or protection. A need
for care and protection is not just a need for services: it hinges on the formation
of a belief that the child in question is in need of care or protection, in the sense
that they are likely to be harmed, ill-treated, abused, or seriously deprived—or
that their parents or guardians are unwilling or unable to care for them.
129
As I
suggest above, these judgments are not objective and may reflect classist
preferences for childrearing.
Oranga Tamariki interventions in pregnancy are likely to have a significant
impact on Māori women. Māori children and young people are significantly
over-represented in the care and protection system—at the time of the 2015
review of child protection services, the majority of children known to the agency
identified as Māori.
130
In general, Māori children are more likely to come into
contact with care and protection services, to be referred to care and protection
125. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 18, at 33.
126. DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILDWELFARE 27 (2002).
127. Bridges, supra note 119 at 168.
128. Id. at 167.
129. Oranga Tamariki Act, Section 14(a). This is not exhaustive: a child is deemed to be in need of
care or protection if they fall within any of the descriptions in Section 14(a) to (i).
130. FINALREPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
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services for perceived risk of harm, and to stay in the care and protection system.
Māori children make up 56 percent of the children in contact with child
protection services by age five, yet only thirty percent of all children born in New
Zealand.
131
For a subset of reports of concern made regarding “unborn children”
and children within five days of birth, Māori children made up 47 percent of
reports of concern in 2018, 51 percent in 2017, and 55 percent in 2016.
132
The reasons for overrepresentation of Māori in child protection data are
complex. A 2015 New Zealand study Understanding Overrepresentation of
Indigenous Children in Child Welfare Data summarized how Indigenous people
explain that overrepresentation is a result of a combination of factors extending
beyond socio-economic disadvantage:
assimilationist policies of colonial governments leading to the
fragmentation of families, inequitable distribution of the goods and
resources of society (e.g., employment, housing, and wealth), systemic
racism of a child welfare protection system imposing white middle-class
notions of family and child-rearing upon indigenous families . . . , and
racial bias in reporting of maltreatment and in child welfare agency
decision making.
133
The 1988 Puao-Te-Ata-Tu report captures the historical perspective on child
protection services in New Zealand.
134
In New Zealand’s colonial history,
inappropriate Pākehā structures and Pākehā determination of Māori issues
“worked to break down traditional Maori society by weakening its base—the
whanau, the hapu, the iwi.”
135
These forces made it almost impossible for Māori
to maintain tribal responsibility for their own people.
136
Ani Mikaere, a
prominent scholar on Māori self-determination and the status of Māori women,
makes clear that the “disruption of Maori social organisation was no mere by-
131. Id. at 34.
132. Letter from Steve Groom, General Manager Public, Ministerial and Executive Services Oranga
Tamariki—Ministry for Children to author (Dec. 17, 2018) (on file with author). This data was provided
in response to a request under the Official Information Act 1982 for the proportion of reports of concern
regarding an “unborn child” where the “unborn child” was of Māori ethnicity.
133. Fiona Cram et al., Understanding Overrepresentation of Indigenous Children in Child Welfare
Data: An Application of the Drake Risk and Bias Models, 20 CHILD MALTREATMENT 171 (2015)
(citations omitted).
134. DEP’T SOCIAL WELFARE, PUAO-TE-ATA-TU (DAY BEAK): THE REPORT OF THE MINISTERIAL
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product of colonization, but an integral part of the process” by which the Crown
aimed to destroy the principle of collectivism that ran through Māori society.
137
The particular impact of colonization on Māori women must be examined at
the “intersection of being Māori and female and all of the diverse and complex
things being located in this intersecting space can mean.”
138
Scholars of mana
wāhine, a type of Māori feminism, have emphasized the unique narratives and
experiences of Māori women in the ongoing history of colonization.
139
Mikaere
illustrates how the traditional Māori worldview emphasized the essential role of
women and the supremacy of their spiritual power in controlling tribal rituals.
140
Mikaere explains that this pattern “of acknowledging the worth of women was
reflected in whānau life,” where “whānau dynamics operated to ensure that
women were well-treated by their husbands and in-laws. . . and the presence of
many to assume responsibility for child rearing enabled women to perform a
wide range of roles, including leadership roles.”
141
Under colonization, the Crown and settlers minimized the spiritual and
traditional roles of Māori women and recast the role in negative terms.
142
This
represented a devaluation of women, which was reinforced by the introduction
of an English concept of “family” that limited women to narrow domestic roles
as the individual “mother of children.”
143
Urbanization and land confiscation
policies further dislocated women from their extended whānau support networks.
Naomi Simmonds notes that when “the whānau unit became progressively
smaller, the responsibilities of individual women grew.”
144
Social and economic disadvantage for Māori is one key driver of
vulnerability for whānau.
145
In June 2018, the unemployment rate for Māori was
9.4 percent, compared to 3.6 percent for New Zealand Europeans.
146
Low income
rates for Māori are consistently higher than the European group: in the period
2015 to 2016, 28 percent of Māori children lived in low income households as
compared to fourteen percent of European children.
147
A higher proportion of
Māori children are in sole-parent beneficiary families and households: 47 percent
of sole parent beneficiary recipients are Māori.
148
These high levels of
137. Annie Mikaere, Collective Rights and Gender Issues: A Maori Women’s Perspective, in
COLLECTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PACIFIC PEOPLES 79, 93 (Nin Tomas ed., 1998) [hereinafter Mikaere
Collective Rights].
138. Naomi Simmonds,Mana Wahine: Decolonising Politics, 25 WOMEN’S STUD. J. 11, 11 (2011).
139. Id. at 16.
140. Ani Mikaere, Cultural Invasion Continued: The Ongoing Colonisation of Tikanga Māori, 18
Y.B. N.Z. JURIS. 134, 139 (2005) [hereinafter Mikaere Cultural Invasion Continued].
141. Id. at 141.
142. Id. at 149; seeMikaere Collective Rights, supra note 137, at 92.
143. Mikaere Cultural Invasion Continued, supra note 140, at 149–50.
144. Simmonds, supra note 138, at 16.
145. CRAM, supra note 4, at 7.
146. DUNCANSON ET AL., supra note 8.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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disadvantage are “symptomatic of the unequal distribution of goods and services
within [New Zealand] society,” where Māori have inequitable access to and
outcomes from universal services such as healthcare and education.
149
Further drivers of Māori whānau vulnerability are prejudice and
discrimination within New Zealand society.
150
The increase in Māori
overrepresentation at successive decision points in the child protection system
suggests an ongoing role of bias against Māori in child protection agency
decision making.
151
Half of referrals to the agency pertain to Māori children and
young people; butMāori comprise six out of every ten children and young people
in State care.
152
The 2016 report of the Modernising Child, Youth and Family
Expert Advisory Panel explicitly acknowledged that “conscious and unconscious
bias in the system” was a possible cause of this overrepresentation.
153
The extension of care and protection powers in the “unborn child” cases is
particularly significant for pregnant women who are most likely to be targeted
by State oversight and least likely to be privileged by dominant norms of good
motherhood. In New Zealand’s context of structural inequality and colonization,
this impact is likely to fall heavily on women experiencing poverty and Māori
women. This uneven impact must be front of mind when considering how State
pregnancy interventions serve to constrain rather than empower pregnant
women.
IV. STATE PREGNANCY INTERVENTIONS PERVERSELYCONSTRAIN, RATHER
THAN EMPOWER, PREGNANTWOMEN
Perversely, New Zealand’s State pregnancy interventions constrain rather
than empower pregnant women. This Part draws out the individual and collective
constraints on pregnant women’s rights, interests and autonomy that are
obscured and ambiguous under the courts’ “unborn child” framework discussed
in Part II.
At the individual level, State oversight of pregnancy may infringe upon a
woman’s right to privacy in that it unduly restricts her ability to make decisions
about her own life. The right to privacy provides a clear framework for
evaluating what limits on a pregnant woman’s autonomy are justified and what
limits exceed the proper powers of the State. Privacy includes “the ability to
make important decisions about one’s own life” and embodies the concept of
149. CRAM, supra note 4, at 21.
150. Id. at 7, 21.
151. Emily Keddell & Gabrielle Davie, Inequalities and Child Protection System Contact in
Aotearoa New Zealand: Developing a Conceptual Framework and Research Agenda, 7 SOCIAL SCI. 89,
97 (2018).
152. Id.
153. FINALREPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
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autonomy.
154
Autonomy incorporates the concepts of self-determination—“a
person’s interest and right . . . in reflectively making significant personal
choices”—and bodily integrity, the ability “to decide what happens in and to
one’s body.”
155
Privacy is a promising developing tool to protect women’s reproductive
choices in New Zealand. At the international level, New Zealand has adopted a
right to privacy through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which protects against arbitrary or unlawful interference with a
person’s privacy, family and home.
156
At the domestic level there is no statutory
privacy right: the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 does not create a right to
privacy, and the Privacy Act 1993 provides protections for informational privacy
but does not create a standalone right. The editors of Privacy Law in New
Zealand suggest that the omission under the Bill of Rights Act may be attributed
to the uncertainty and ambiguity of the privacy concept and the difficulty of
defining the right.
157
Despite the absence of a standalone right, a fundamental right to privacy
may be developed through New Zealand’s common law, in light of its
international commitments under the ICCPR and through the comparative
precedents for privacy rights in the United States and Canada.
158
The Bill of
Rights is not a comprehensive statement of all the rights and freedoms in New
Zealand
159
and the New Zealand courts have acknowledged the need to develop
the common law consistently with the guidance of international treaties to which
New Zealand is a party, even where the international obligations are not
expressly incorporated in statute.
160
Notably, the 2018 Law Commission briefing
on alternative approaches to abortion law recorded the New Zealand Privacy
Commissioner’s submission that abortion engages a fundamental privacy right
inherent in bodily autonomy and self-determination.
161
Dorothy Roberts highlights the value of a privacy right in her
groundbreaking 1991 article “Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy.”
162
Roberts draws out two
154. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ABORTION LAW:
MINISTERIAL BRIEFING PAPER 53 (2018), https://lawcom.govt.nz/sites/default/files/projectAvailableFor
mats/Law%20Commission%20-%20ALR%20Ministerial%20Briefing%20Paper%20-%20FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96AH-ZZJN].
155. SCOTT, supra note 107, at 13-14.
156. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
157. Stephen Penk, Thinking About Privacy, in Privacy Law, in NEW ZEALAND 20 (Stephen Penk &
Rosemary Tobin eds., 2d ed. 2016).
158. See, e.g., R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
159. Penk, supra note 157, at 20.
160. Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34, [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [6].
161. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, supra note 154, at [3.4]; PRIVACY COMMISSIONER’S
SUBMISSION TO THE LAWCOMMISSION ON ABORTION LAW REFORM, https://www.privacy.org.nz/assets/
Uploads/Abortion-Law-Reform-submission-to-Law-Commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/662X-JXHE].
162. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and
the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
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critical benefits of a privacy concept for advancing the reproductive rights of
women of color: the right emphasizes the value of “personhood” and protects
against the abuse of government power.
163
Personhood is particularly significant
because it affirms the role of Black women’s will and challenges the historical
devaluation of Black motherhood in the history of the United States.
164
Privacy
delineates the limits of government power in a way that is particularly valuable
for women of color who, in countries where persons of color are in minority or
marginalized groups, are most vulnerable to government control of their private
decision making.
165
Extending care and protection powers to “unborn children” compromises the
privacy right of pregnant women. Oranga Tamariki claims to address children
but its oversight regulates pregnant women’s choices about how they run their
lives and what they do with their bodies. The regulation may span what they
ingest, who they partner or live with, where they live and when or how they
travel.
166
A nebulous concern about interfering with pregnant women’s choices
in this way is acknowledged in the New Zealand “unborn child” cases but never
articulated as a real, salient competing right to privacy.
167
The right to privacy is not absolute.
168
The protection within the ICCPR
prohibits only “arbitrary” or “unlawful interference” and privacy claims are
balanced against competing public interests. One may argue that some State
engagement with pregnant women’s choices is justified because the limit on
decision making is minimal (for example, the idea of discouraging pregnant
women from smoking or consuming alcohol) and outweighed by the State’s
interest in promoting the health of the population.
Yet Oranga Tamariki oversight goes beyond minimal health interventions in
two ways. First, Oranga Tamariki oversight of pregnant women’s choices comes
with the understanding that if the State determines these choices are putting an
“unborn child” at risk of harm, the State may activate its care and protection
powers to either reach a family group conference plan for the “unborn child” or
apply to the court for formal orders. The most intrusive formal order would place
163. Id. at 1468.
164. Id. at 1469.
165. Id. at 1469-70.
166. Memorandum from Mindy Jane Roseman on the State of the Field: Fetal Personhood and
Women’s Rights 11 (on file with author).
167. For example, Justice Heath in Re an Unborn Child emphasizes that the “invasive step” of
interfering with the pregnant woman’s decisions as a mother should only be taken for very good reasons.
Re an Unborn Child, [2003] NZLR at [27]-[28]. See also Justice Heath’s discussion of the academic
criticism of In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child), [1995] NZFLR 577 (FC): “The decision was
criticised on the basis that it ran the risk of creating a conflict with the mother’s own interests; in particular,
the decision created the potential for the Court making orders which controlled the mother’s behaviour
during pregnancy, albeit, ostensibly, for the purposes of promoting the welfare of the unborn child.”
Unborn Children: ‘Persons’ and Maternal Conduct, 5 MED L. REV. 143 (1997).
168. Penk, supra note 157, at 19.
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the “unborn child” in the custody of Oranga Tamariki and allow Oranga
Tamariki to remove the child at birth.
169
Second, Oranga Tamariki is a State agency centered on the care and
protection of children. Activating the care and protection function of Oranga
Tamariki before birth fundamentally pits the rights of the pregnant woman
against her fetus. It separates the interests of the fetus (the “unborn child”) and
prioritizes those interests as the paramount consideration for the agency and the
court. As outlined above, the interests of the pregnant woman and her fetus will
often overlap and may be the same. But the controlling interest is that of the
fetus: when there is a tension between the interests of the two subjects the
pregnant woman’s interest will be secondary to the imperative of preventing
harm to the fetus, and when there is no tension the recognition of the pregnant
woman’s interest is contingent on that aligned interest of her fetus. The pregnant
woman is instrumental to the best interests of her fetus. This process obscures
the pregnant woman, even as it fails to fully support her ability to determine the
conditions of her parenthood.
The interference with pregnant women’s privacy—both their autonomy in
decision making and their bodily integrity—is a harm in itself. Interference may
also create a risk of physical and mental harm to the pregnant woman and to the
fetus. The threat of State punitive approaches to pregnancy, including the threat
of seeking custody orders to remove the child from its parent at birth, can deter
women from seeking State assistance or voluntarily engaging with social
services during pregnancy.
170
For example, the judgment in Re an Unborn Child
records that the pregnant woman, Nikki, was unable to give evidence as she had
been admitted to hospital and it was “likely that the stress of [the] proceeding
has caused her current health problems.”
171
In L v Chief Executive of Oranga
Tamariki—Ministry for Children, Justice Muir commented that the applicant
parents did not appear in the hearing because they were “in hiding” from the
State.
172
At the collective level, Oranga Tamariki oversight can impose a standard for
family life that excludes women who fall outside dominant norms of good
motherhood.
173
If the Oranga Tamariki interest in “unborn children”
disproportionately targets women experiencing poverty and some Māori women,
that interest in practice goes beyond an individual interference with lifestyle
decisions in privacy and becomes a judgment about who is entitled to become a
169. Oranga Tamariki Act at Section 78.
170. Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishing Women for Their Behavior During Pregnancy: An Approach That
Undermines the Health of Women and Children 6 (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2000),
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub_bp_punishingwomen.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3TY-YBFK].
171. Re an Unborn Child, [2003] NZLR at [73]–[74].
172. L v Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki—Ministry for Children, [2018] NZHC 1420 at 9.
173. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 162, at 1463.
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mother.
174
In this sense the policies perpetuate the subordination of women in
New Zealand. The policies simultaneously claim to value life through
prioritizing interventions for the “unborn” life to meet “high aspirations” for the
long-term improvement in health, education and other social outcomes
175
while
devaluing existing life and motherhood in the pregnant woman.
Further, Oranga Tamariki oversight of individual pregnant women distracts
the public from the broader State supports that are required to improve child
wellbeing. The policies alleviate the burden on the State to address broader
deprivation and discourages society from inquiring into other non-intrusive, non-
punitive solutions to the problem of child wellbeing.
176
It is perverse that the State interventions in pregnancy serve to constrain
rather than empower pregnant women. The State is not only failing to address
the complex history of structural inequality and colonial oppression that renders
certain pregnant women vulnerable to Oranga Tamariki oversight, it is imposing
interventions that further constrain the very women it has an obligation to
empower. Fundamentally, the State does not trust women to be partners in its
interventions to protect the fetus or “unborn child” from harm and help it to thrive
at birth. While the State purports to work with a pregnant woman to support her
health and prepare for birth,
177
its efforts are hedged by a distrust of women’s
choices and an eagerness to step in to replace the woman’s judgment with that
of Oranga Tamariki and the Court.
178
V. RECONSTRUCTING STATE PREGNANCY INTERVENTION TO EMPOWER
PREGNANTWOMEN
New Zealand must reconstruct State pregnancy intervention to empower all
pregnant women. I acknowledge that any reconstruction of pregnancy
intervention within the State child protection branch will face the problem of
how to overcome the structural limits of the paramountcy principle and the
rescue model. Notwithstanding these challenges, the State’s vexed relationship
with pregnant women cannot be resolved by the State withdrawing from
pregnancy altogether. The State must instead rise to the challenge of
reconstructing pregnancy interventions that promote women’s wellbeing and
autonomous decision making.
174. Id. at 1459–60.
175. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11; Who We Are, ORANGA TAMARIKI, https://www.oranga
tamariki.govt.nz/about-us/overview/ [https://perma.cc/ZU8H-MYVT].
176. Roberts, supra note 162, at 1436.
177. See supra Part I.
178. See, e.g., In the matter of Baby P (an unborn child) [1995] NZFLR 577 (FC) at 583–84.
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A. Problem of Overcoming Paramountcy Principle and Rescue Model
Two core features of traditional child protection services are fundamentally
incompatible with the autonomy of pregnant women: the paramountcy principle
and the rescue model. These structural limits cast doubt on whether the State can
achieve positive, empowering pregnancy intervention within the child protection
branch of government.
The “paramountcy principle” is the principle introduced in Part I that the
child’s welfare and interests must be the first and paramount consideration in all
decision making under the primary statute for the care and protection of
children.
179
When the State applies the paramountcy principle to the fetus in the
frame of an “unborn child” it sets up a contest between the woman and her fetus
and the woman and her future child. As I have outlined in Parts II and IV, the
principle elevates the fetus to the position of “child” whose welfare and interests
should be prioritized at the expense of the interests of the pregnant woman.
The second challenge arises from the “rescue model.” The “rescue model”
is the idea that the State meets its responsibilities for child wellbeing by
establishing standards for the care and protection of children and intervening to
“rescue” children when parents fail to meet those standards.
180
As I have
explained in Parts I and III, the State sets the standards for the care and protection
of children and the discretionary application of these standards in an environment
of structural inequality and colonial oppression serves to impose dominant white
middle-class norms of parenting and motherhood.
The rescue model places the primary responsibility for child wellbeing on
individual parents and ignores the social or economic conditions that constrain
the parents’ ability to meet the standards for care.
181
It works on an assumption
that families should be independent from the State and that good parents will be
able to meet all of a child’s needs.
182
This underplays the complex economic and
social constraints on parents’ everyday ability to care for their children and
reduces the State role to moments of crisis.
183
Because intervention is triggered
by reports for these crisis moments, intervention becomes a punitive response to
individual failure. The State intervenes to punish deficient parents through
intrusive oversight of their decision making and the looming threat of moving
the children from the parents’ custody to the custody of the State.
184
179. See Oranga Tamariki Act at Section 6 (demonstrating the “paramountcy principle”).
180. See ROBERTS, supra note 126, at 74.
181. Id. at 89.
182. See, e.g., EMILY KEDDELL, THE CHILD YOUTH AND FAMILY REVIEW: A COMMENTARY ON
PREVENTION 19 (2017), https://thepolicyobservatory.aut.ac.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/81249/Emily-
Keddell-CAN-report-June-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/59LE-GPYG]; Dorothy Roberts, The Child
Welfare System’s Racial Harm, 44 NOMOS 98, 104 (2003).
183. ROBERTS, supra note 126, at 89.
184. Id. at 90–91.
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The new investment focus of Oranga Tamariki is a partial move away from
rescue responses and towards early support of families. However, such
innovations continue to be pasted on top of the traditional crisis response
structure where reports of concern trigger discretionary Oranga Tamariki contact
and interventions are guided by the child’s paramount interests. While this
structure endures, pregnancy intervention within the child protection branch
cannot be effective to empower pregnant women.
B. Reconstructing, Not Rejecting, State Intervention
Yet the State’s vexed relationship with pregnant women cannot be resolved
by the State’s withdrawal from pregnancy altogether. In the reproductive health
information context, Professor Lynn Freedman has called for a questioning of
the traditional modes of thinking about human rights that reject State
involvement, arguing that: “Our goal is not simply to eradicate the practice or
prevent state intrusion on a basic freedom by rejecting any state involvement in
the issue. Women need and want high quality reproductive health services, and
states are key to ensuring that they get them.”
185
Freedman’s call to use human rights principles to think about how, not
whether, the State should intervene in individual lives to best promote human
dignity and welfare is equally pertinent to the examination of State intervention
in pregnancy. Denying State support for pregnant women would simply impose
a different kind of limit on women’s ability to make decisions and take action to
prepare for wanted, healthy pregnancies and stable parenting relationships.
For this reason, the objective is not to do away with State intervention in
pregnancy but for the State to reconstruct it in a way that promotes women’s
wellbeing and autonomous decision making. The reconstruction of State
intervention in pregnancy is supported by an affirmative concept of the right to
privacy, the concept of reproductive autonomy, the Crown’s positive obligations
to Māori under Te Tiriti o Waitangi and New Zealand’s international treaty
obligations.
Dorothy Roberts presents an affirmative right to privacy that emphasizes a
duty of the State to provide the necessary social conditions and resources to
support fully autonomous decision making.
186
Critically, the affirmative view
recognizes the connection between privacy and equality, where “the
dehumanization of the individual” is tied to the broader “subordination of the
group.”
187
Roberts contends that the government’s “duty to guarantee
185. Lynn P. Freedman, Censorship andManipulation of Reproductive Health Information: An Issue
of Human Rights and Women’s Health, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH INFORMATION 1, 2 (Sandra Coliver ed., 1995).
186. Roberts, supra note 162, at 1479.
187. Id. at 1480.
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personhood and autonomy stems not only from the needs of the individual, but
also from the needs of the entire community.”
188
Erin Nelson has proposed an account of reproductive autonomy that:
favours State intervention to the extent that it involves positive
involvement by the State in the lives of pregnant women who need
support in order to exercise reproductive autonomy (even only to a
limited extent), and whose capacity for autonomy will be increased by
the provision of such support and assistance.
189
This focus on enhancing autonomy is most pertinent for the pregnant
woman, who is carrying the fetus and thus will be the most directly affected of
any State intervention. It also extends to the other parent or involved family
members: the autonomy constraint is both in avoiding constraining the ability of
the family to make choices, and in promoting the ability to make choices.
The objective of building positive State intervention is further supported by
the New Zealand Crown’s positive obligations to Māori under Te Tiriti o
Waitangi. The Oranga Tamariki Act, and any statute dealing with the control of
children, is colored by the key Treaty principles of partnership, protection and
participation.
190
In the context of child protection services, the Treaty preserves
and protects the familial organization of Māori.
191
By July 1, 2019, Oranga
Tamariki will carry new statutory duties to recognize and provide a practical
commitment to the Treaty principles.
192
The duties include ensuring that the
policies, practices and services of Oranga Tamariki “have regard to mana tamaiti
(tamariki) and the whakapapa of Māori children and young persons and the
whanaungatanga responsibilities of their whanau, hapū, and iwi.”
193
In the
context of health services, the Treaty principles further require the State to work
together with Māori communities to improve strategies forMāori health, involve
188. Id.
189. ERIN NELSON, LAW, POLICY AND REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY 204 (2013).
190. Barton Prescott v. Director-General of Social Welfare [1997] 3 NZLR 179 (HC); New Zealand
Māori Council v. Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 140 (CA). This Note does not address the ongoing
critique of the Treaty principles. See, e.g., ANI MIKAERE, COLONISING MYTHS MĀORI REALITIES HE
RUKURUKUWHAKAARO 139 (2011).
191. Barton Prescott v. Director-General of Social Welfare [1997] 3 NZLR 179 (HC).
192. Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Oranga Tamariki) Legislation Act 2017, Section
14.
193. “Mana tamaiti (tamariki)” is defined in the Act as “the intrinsic value and inherent dignity
derived from a child’s or young person’s whakapapa (genealogy) and their belonging to a whānau, hapū,
iwi, or family group, in accordance with tikangaMāori or its equivalent in the culture of the child or young
person.” Id. at Section 1(7). “Whakapapa” is defined as “the multi-generational kinship relationships that
help to describe who the person is in terms of their mātua (parents), and tūpuna (ancestors), from whom
they descend” and “whanaungatanga” as “the purposeful carrying out of responsibilities based on
obligations to whakapapa,” “the kinship that provides the foundations for reciprocal obligations and
responsibilities to be met” and “the wider kinship ties that need to be protected and maintained to ensure
the maintenance and protection of their sense of belonging, identity, and connection.” Id.
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Māori in all levels of decision making and delivery of services, and ensure that
Māori have at least the same level of health as non-Māori.
194
State support of pregnancy is consistent with New Zealand’s international
treaty obligations to support family life. The ICCPR describes the family as “the
natural and fundamental group of unit of society,” which is “entitled to protection
by society and the State” under Article 23 of the Convention. Article 12 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
requires State parties to “ensure to women appropriate services in connection
with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services
where necessary.”
195
While the Convention on the Rights of the Child’s protections before birth
must be limited and are subject to a debate around whether the definition of
“child” includes “the unborn,”
196
the Convention clearly emphasizes the positive
obligation for the State to provide the conditions for a healthy family life. In
particular, Article 19(2) of the Convention directs States to provide “protective
measures” against abuse and neglect, including “effective procedures for the
establishment of social programmes to provide necessary support for the child
and for those who have the care of the child.”
197
Article 24(2)(d) requires States
to ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal healthcare.
198
Article 27(3) places
the primary responsibility for a child’s living conditions on their parents but also
points States to “provide material assistance and support programmes,
particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.”
199
These positive
obligations to support families do not hinge on the fetus itself being a child, but
should extend to support in preparation for birth.
C. Steps Towards Reconstruction
I propose two initial steps toward reconstruction of State pregnancy
intervention to empower New Zealand women.
The first step is to move away from narrowly targeted crisis interventions
and towards broad universal support. One piece of this shift is to address the
disjunction between motherhood norms and motherhood realities that leads
discretionary Oranga Tamariki interventions to target a marginalized subset of
194. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, THE GUIDE TO HE KOROWAI ORANGA: MĀORI HEALTH STRATEGY 12
(2014), https://www.health.govt.nz/system/files/documents/publications/guide-to-he-korowai-oranga-ma
ori-health-strategy-jun14-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3CS-TN33].
195. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 12, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
196. See Mitra, supra note 79, for a discussion of the debate and compromise regarding how to
approach the “unborn” in the Convention in the context of disagreement on State approaches to abortion
and the ambiguity of the preamble reference to “appropriate legal protection” before birth.
197. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 15, art. 19(2).
198. Id. art. 24(2)(d).
199. Id. art. 27(3) makes clear this is subject to the State’s “national conditions” and “means.”
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pregnant women. Oranga Tamariki must work to embrace understandings of
parenting that effectively disrupt the place of white, middle-class norms of good
motherhood as the center of care and protection standards. A further piece is to
prioritize universalized support services that aim to provide the social and
economic conditions necessary for parents to meet the expected standards of care
and enhance the existing capacities of the whānau to engage in
self-determination and autonomous decision making.
200
Such services would
provide critical support for families to prepare for birth without the looming
threat of punitive interventions to override the judgment of the pregnant women
or place the fetus into the formal custody of the State.
The second step is to abandon the State’s claimed interest in the fetus as an
unborn child separate from the pregnant woman and replace this with an interest
in the health and wellbeing of the family or whānau. The interest in the family
or whānau may mean the pregnant woman alone, the pregnant woman and her
wanted future child, the pregnant woman and partner, or the pregnant woman
and a broader family group. Instead of shoehorning pregnancy interventions into
the traditional care and protection model and thereby sacrificing the rights-
bearing pregnant woman to the paramount interests of her fetus, the model would
situate the woman within her chosen family and community and provide
conditions for her empowerment.
CONCLUSION
State intervention in pregnancy must be reconstructed to maximize its
promise and guard against its perils. On the promise side, a reconstructed
intervention must recognize that pregnancy is indeed a unique opportunity for
the State to put a family in the best possible position to prepare for a wanted,
healthy pregnancy and a stable parenting relationship. On the peril side, State
intervention must recognize that the fetus is not a child and that traditional child
protection tools are inappropriate. This does not mean that the State does not
have any duties toward a wanted child, but these duties are tied to the woman’s
desire to produce a healthy child and her rights to the conditions that make this
desired result possible.
There are no easy solutions to the State’s vexed relationship with pregnancy.
Going forward, it will be necessary to examine whether positive, empowering,
affirmative intervention can be achieved within the child protection branch or
whether the child protection branch is inevitably a site of constraint for pregnant
women. The inquiry must interrogate how the State can bring its duty to grapple
200. L. Ruwhiu, Indigenous Issues in Aotearoa New Zealand, in M. CONNOLLY, M. & L. HARMS,
EDS., SOCIALWORK: CONTEXT AND PRACTICE 107, 118 (2009).
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with the deeper structural conditions limiting children’s wellbeing in
New Zealand into its immediate relationship with individual families.
